Intergovernmental grants are the main revenue source of local governments. In the fiscal decentralization literature it has been argued that fiscal disparities across the regions are accounted for in the central-government grant distribution. However, some argue that grants are given to localities to increase the reelection chances of the incumbent or to increase the votes at election. To compete with the opposition parties the incumbent party may try to allocate the grants to aligned local governments. In this paper we analyze the grant allocation in Turkey. We test empirically whether central-government’s budgetary transfers to the municipalities were made on the basis of economic criteria or in accordance with the political interest of politicians, and hence the coalition government. To test the hypothesis we followed the literature but we used additional variables. Using municipal data in sixty-one provinces, we find that the desire to secure reelection motivates politicians.
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Volume (Year): 26 (2008) Issue (Month): 5 (October) Pages: 954-967 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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