Fiscal perception and voting
AbstractThe effect of local fiscal policy perception on the electoral process in a representative democracy is investigated. The test is made by using an ordinary least squares regression on a sample of fifty Spanish municipalities. The dependent variable is the relative increase in the number of votes in support of the political party in power between the two previous local elections, and the independent variables are public investment and taxes collected by local government. The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that fiscal perception affects voters' behaviour.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Pion Ltd, London in its journal Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy.
Volume (Year): 11 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.pion.co.uk
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- Sole Olle, Albert, 2003. "Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition government, and ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 685-713, November.
- Albert Solé Ollé, 2005.
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2005/2, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Albert Solé-Ollé, 2006. "The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 145-176, January.
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