The Structural Funds and additionality in Wales: devolution and multilevel governance
AbstractStudies examining the additionality of Structural Funds in UK regions have emphasised the dominant 'gatekeeping' role played by central government. This has been explained by the 'global' interpretation of additionality adopted by UK central government, coupled with the absence of a strong tier of regional government. Based on preparations for an Objective 1 programme in Wales, in this paper we critically evaluate the progress made by the devolved National Assembly for Wales in challenging the central government interpretation of additionality. This suggests that, in the context of devolution, matters surrounding Structural Fund finances will become more fiercely contested, exposing significant tensions between processes of decentralisation and centralisation within the UK polity.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Pion Ltd, London in its journal Environment and Planning A.
Volume (Year): 33 (2001)
Issue (Month): 6 (June)
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Web page: http://www.pion.co.uk
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