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Challenges of Direct European Supervision of Financial Markets


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  • László Szegedi

    (Eötvös Lóránd Science University)

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    The response of the European Union to the financial crises included the establishment of bodies dedicated to macroprudential as well as microprudential supervision called European System of Financial Supervisors. As result of the reform regulatory powers have been delegated to sector-specific European Supervisory Authorities in charge of microprudential supervision. The delegation could contravene the Lisbon primary law, especially the related case law followed by the Court of Justice of the European Union as the so-called Meroni doctrine restricts the delegation of concrete binding decision-making powers on European agencies like ESAs. However their power to issue individual decisions, addressed to financial institutions, could be considered as required tool in crisis management which makes it obvious that the primary EU law on European agencies needs to be clarified and broadened.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by State Audit Office of Hungary in its journal Public Finance Quarterly.

    Volume (Year): 57 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 347-357

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    Handle: RePEc:pfq:journl:v:57:y:2012:i:3:p:347-357

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    Related research

    Keywords: Internal Market; Financial crisis; European Supervisory Authorities; EU Agencies; Meroni doctrine;

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