A Model of Income Tax Evasion with Venal Tax Officials: The Case of Taiwan
AbstractBased on interviews with 1/10 of all the CPAs in Taiwan, a prototype of income tax evasion within a corrupt bureaucratic system is summarized. It is shown that the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model of tax evasion needs to be modified to capture the characteristic of this prototype. Conventional tactics (increasing penalty, raising the probability of detection) may only encourage taxpayers to intensify their bribing activities to avoid possible punishment, which can further corrupt the tax system. Instead, in developing countries where tax evasion goes hand in hand with corruption, a crack-down on corruption seems to be a more sensible approach.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Public Finance = Finances publiques.
Volume (Year): 45 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- Laszlo Goerke, 2008.
"Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 177-196, May.
- Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April.
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