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Income Distribution And Rent Seeking Costs: A Note

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  • Maria Alessandra Antonelli

    ()
    (“La Sapienza” University of Rome, Faculty of Law, Italy)

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    Abstract

    This paper analyzes a rent seeking competition where risk neutral agents have a different income. The individual income is private information but the income distribution is common information. Like the Hillman and Samet (1987) model the individual outlays in rent seeking is equal to the expected rent, but the winning probability for each agent is a function of its income. As a consequence, the social costs of the rent seeking depend on the income distribution and they can be lesser than the traditional measure pointed out by Hillman and Samet (1987).

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    File URL: http://upet.ro/annals/economics/pdf/2010/20100301.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Petrosani, Romania in its journal Annals of the University of Petrosani - Economics.

    Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 5-12

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    Handle: RePEc:pet:annals:v:10:y:2010:i:3:p:5-12

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    Web page: http://www.upet.ro/

    Related research

    Keywords: rent-seeking; dissipation of rent; income distribution;

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    1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 411-422, September.
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