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¿Premian Las Tarifas El Desempeño Del Transportista?

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Author Info
MARCOS SINGER () (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)
PATRICIO DONOSO () (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)
SVEN WIDDEL () (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

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Abstract

We develop an agency model subject to moral hazard to evaluate whether delivery prices reward carriers for their performance, or arbitrarily benefit some carriers and harm others. From the model, we derive several propositions that we test on a panel data of 58 carriers that work for a shipper in Santiago, over 93 weeks. We verify that the shipper rewards the experience, fleet size and service quality provided by the carrier, but not the quality of the trucks. The carrier has incentives to visit many clients, but not to travel longer distances. We also confirm that prices are sensitive to the alternatives to the agreement between the shipper and the carrier. However, a number of carriers are over or under compensated for no apparent reason.

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File URL: http://www.abante.cl/files/ABT/Contenidos/Vol-10-N1/Singer.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal ABANTE.

Volume (Year): 10 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 21-55
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Handle: RePEc:pch:abante:v:10:y:2007:i:1:p:21-55

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Related research
Keywords: Freight transportation; Agency relationship; Incentives; Chile;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1619-1650, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Francine Lafontaine & Scott E. Masten, 2002. "Contracting in the Absence of Specific Investments and Moral Hazard: Understanding Carrier-Driver Relations in U.S. Trucking," NBER Working Papers 8859, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hubbard, Thomas N, 2001. "Contractual Form and Market Thickness in Trucking," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 369-86, Summer.
  4. Jack A. Nickerson & Brian S. Silverman, 2003. "Why aren't all Truck Drivers Owner-Operators? Asset Ownership and the Employment Relation in Interstate for-hire Trucking," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 91-118, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lim, Wei Shi, 2000. "A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 519-525, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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