Market Liberalization Policies in a Reforming Socialist Economy
AbstractA model of a socialist economy is presented, incorporating bargaining over wages and employment in the socialized sector and shortages that are reflected in the black market. The model is used to analyze the implications of liberalization policies, including trade liberalization, an administered price increase, and provisions allowing for increased direct foreign investment. The results suggest that reforms may have different effects under different trade regimes, that small price reforms may have perverse effects, and that foreign investment in a shortage economy may be immiserizing.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund.
Volume (Year): 39 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/
Postal: Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Subscription Department, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, UK
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P21 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
- P33 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - International Trade, Finance, Investment, Business, and Aid
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- Cecilia Testa, 2001.
"Reform, Lobbies and Welfare: A Common Agency Approach,"
Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics
01/6, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Dec 2001.
- Cecilia Testa, 2005. "Reforms, lobbies and welfare: A common agency approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 305-337, December.
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