Private Supplementary Health Insurance: Retirees' Demand
AbstractIn France, about 90 per cent of the population is covered by private health insurance that supplements public health insurance. More than half of policyholders obtain their coverage through their employer. Considering the financial benefits associated with group contracts compared to individual contracts, we assume that switching behaviours vary among different beneficiaries during the transition to retirement. The gap in premiums at retirement between group and individual contracts gives the opportunity to study the marginal price effect on switching behaviours. In this study, we consider the nature of the contract prior to retirement (compulsory or voluntary membership group contract and individual contract) as an indirect measure of the price effect. We show the significance of this price effect as policyholders formerly enrolled in group contracts switch much more frequently than those formerly covered by an individual contract. We also discuss other determinants of the decision to switch private supplementary health insurance. The Geneva Papers (2008) 33, 610–626. doi:10.1057/gpp.2008.31
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice.
Volume (Year): 33 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Other versions of this item:
- Carine Franc & Marc Perronnin & Aurelie Pierre, 2008. "Private supplemental health insurance: retirees' demand," Working Papers, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics DT9, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Apr 2008.
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I19 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Other
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Samuelson, William & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1988. " Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 7-59, March.
- Marquis, M Susan & Phelps, Charles E, 1987. "Price Elasticity and Adverse Selection in the Demand for Supplementary Health Insurance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(2), pages 299-313, April.
- Zeynep Or & Chantal Cases & Melanie Lisac & Karsten Vrangbaek & Ulrika Winblad & Gwyn Bevan, 2009.
"Are Health Problems Systemic? Politics of Access and Choice under Beveridge and Bismarck Systems,"
Working Papers, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics
DT27, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Sep 2009.
- Or, Zeynep & Cases, Chantal & Lisac, Melanie & Vrangbæk, Karsten & Winblad, Ulrika & Bevan, Gwyn, 2010. "Are health problems systemic? Politics of access and choice under Beveridge and Bismarck systems," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(03), pages 269-293, July.
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