Consumer Risk Perceptions and Information in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection
AbstractStandard models of adverse selection in insurance markets assume policyholders know their loss distributions. This study examines the nature of equilibrium and the equilibrium value of information in competitive insurance markets where consumers lack complete information regarding their loss probabilities. We show that additional private information is privately and socially valuable. When the equilibrium policies separate types, policyholders can deduce the underlying probabilities from the contracts, so it is information on risk type, rather than loss probability per se, that is valuable. We show that the equilibrium is “as if” policyholders were endowed with complete knowledge if, and only if, information is noiseless and costless. If information is noisy, the equilibrium depends on policyholders' prior beliefs and the amount of noise in the information they acquire. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1996) 21, 191–210. doi:10.1007/BF00941938
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory.
Volume (Year): 21 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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- Michael Hoy & Peter Lambert, .
"Genetic Screening and Price Discrimination in Insurance Markets,"
99/25, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Michael Hoy & Peter Lambert, 2000. "Genetic Screening and Price Discrimination in Insurance Markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(2), pages 103-130, December.
- Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 1999.
"Information and Dynamic Adjustment in Life Insurance Markets,"
UWO Department of Economics Working Papers
9912, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Mattias K. Polborn & Mike Hoy & Asha Sadanand, 1999. "Information and Dynamic Adjustment in Life Insurance Markets," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9911, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
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