The Economic Consequences of IPO Spinning
AbstractUsing a sample of fifty-six companies going public in 1996--2000 in which top executives received allocations of other hot initial public offerings (IPOs) from the bookrunner, a practice known as spinning, we examine the consequences of spinning. The fifty-six IPOs had first-day returns that were, on average, 23% higher than similar IPOs. The profits collected by these executives were only a small fraction of the incremental amount of money left on the table by their companies when they went public. These companies were dramatically less likely to switch investment bankers in a follow-on offer: only 6% of issuers whose executives were spun switched underwriters, whereas 31% of other issuers switched. These findings suggest that the spinning of executives accomplished its goal of affecting corporate decisions. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org., Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal The Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 23 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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