Brokerage Commissions and Institutional Trading Patterns
Abstract
The institutional brokerage industry faces an ever-increasing pressure to lower trading costs, which has already driven down average commissions and shifted volume toward low-cost execution venues. However, traditional full-service brokers that bundle execution with services remain a force and their commissions are still considerably higher than the marginal cost of trade execution. We hypothesize that commissions constitute a convenient way of charging a prearranged fixed fee for long-term access to a broker's premium services. We derive testable predictions based on this hypothesis and test them on a large sample of institutional trades from 1999 to 2003. We find that institutions negotiate commissions infrequently, and thus commissions vary little with trade characteristics. Institutions also concentrate their order flow with a relatively small set of brokers, with smaller institutions concentrating their trading more than large institutions and paying higher per-share commissions. These results are stable over time, are consistent with our predictions, and cannot be explained by cost-minimization alone. Finally, we discuss the evolution of the institutional brokerage market within the proposed framework and make informal predictions about future developments in the industry. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal The Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 22 (2009)
Issue (Month): 12 (December)
Pages: 5175-5212
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Michael Goldstein & Paul Irvine & Eugene Kandel & Zvi Wiener, 2004. "Brokerage Commissions and Institutional Trading Patterns," Discussion Paper Series dp356, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Johannes A. Skjeltorp & Elvira Sojli & Wing Wah Tham, 2011.
"Sunshine trading: Flashes of trading intent at the NASDAQ,"
Working Paper
2011/17, Norges Bank.
- Johannes A. Skjeltorp & Elvira Sojli & Wing Wah Tham, 2012. "Sunshine Trading: Flashes of Trading Intent at the NASDAQ," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-141/IV/DSF47, Tinbergen Institute.
- Kedia, Simi & Zhou, Xing, 2011. "Local market makers, liquidity and market quality," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 540-567, November.
- Niehaus, Greg & Zhang, Donghang, 2010. "The impact of sell-side analyst research coverage on an affiliated broker's market share of trading volume," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 776-787, April.
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- Alexander, Gordon J. & Peterson, Mark A., 2007. "An analysis of trade-size clustering and its relation to stealth trading," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 435-471, May.
- Hu, Gang, 2009. "Measures of implicit trading costs and buy-sell asymmetry," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 418-437, August.
- Qin Lei & Murli Rajan & Xuewu Wang, 2012. "An empirical analysis of corporate insiders' trading performance," China Finance Review International, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 2(3), pages 246-264, June.
- Lipson, Marc L. & Mortal, Sandra, 2006. "The effect of stock splits on clientele: Is tick size relevant?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(5), pages 878-896, December.
- Anand, Amber & Chakravarty, Sugato & Chuwonganant, Chairat, 2009. "Cleaning house: Stock reassignments on the NYSE," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 727-753, November.
- Green, T. Clifton & Jame, Russell, 2011. "Strategic trading by index funds and liquidity provision around S&P 500 index additions," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 605-624, November.
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