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Capital Structure, Compensation and Incentives

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  • Alan V. S. Douglas

Abstract

This article illustrates an incentive-aligning role of debt in the presence of optimal compensation contracts. Owing to information asymmetry, value-maximizing compensation contracts allow managerial rents following high investment outcomes. The manager has an incentive to increase these rents by choosing investments that generate greater information asymmetry. An aptly chosen debt level mitigates this incentive, because investments that generate greater information asymmetry have more volatile outcomes. The greater volatility would make the debt risky, causing the shareholders to focus on high outcomes and therefore compensation contracts that reduce managerial rents. At the optimum, the manager avoids opportunistic investments, and the shareholders offer value-maximizing compensation contracts. Empirically, the analysis predicts a negative relationship between leverage and market-to-book that is reversed at extreme market-to-book ratios, a negative relationship between leverage and profitability, a negative relationship between leverage and pay-for-performance, and a positive relationship between pay-for-performance and investment opportunities. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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  • Alan V. S. Douglas, 2006. "Capital Structure, Compensation and Incentives," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(2), pages 605-632.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:19:y:2006:i:2:p:605-632
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhj010
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    Cited by:

    1. Cai, Jie & Zhang, Zhe, 2011. "Leverage change, debt overhang, and stock prices," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 391-402, June.
    2. Kim, Kyonghee & Patro, Sukesh & Pereira, Raynolde, 2017. "Option incentives, leverage, and risk-taking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-18.
    3. Robert W Faff & Stephen Gray & Kelvin Jui Keng Tan, 2016. "A contemporary view of corporate finance theory, empirical evidence and practice," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 41(4), pages 662-686, November.
    4. Acrey, James Cash & McCumber, William R. & Nguyen, Thu Hien T., 2011. "CEO incentives and bank risk," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 456-471, September.
    5. Yusnidah Ibrahim & Md Mohan Uddin & Kamarun Nisham Taufil Mohd & Mohd Sobri Minai, 2013. "Agency Costs and the Long-Run Performance of Debt Issuers," Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance (AAMJAF), Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, vol. 9(1), pages 67-87.
    6. Huang, Hsing-Hua & Huang, Hongming & Shih, Pai-Ta, 2012. "Real options and earnings-based bonus compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2389-2402.
    7. Florackis, Chrisostomos & Kostakis, Alexandros & Ozkan, Aydin, 2009. "Managerial ownership and performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(12), pages 1350-1357, December.

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