Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives
AbstractIn this article, we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments. Net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non-interest-bearing reserves, but increases moral hazard problems. The 'put option' value of default under net settlement can also distort banks' investment incentives. Absent these distortions, net settlement dominates gross, although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 11 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 1996. "Payment system settlement and bank incentives," Working Paper 96-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, . "Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-32, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 1997. "Payment system settlement and bank incentives," Proceedings 537, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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