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Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation

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  • Ann B. Gillette
  • Thomas H. Noe
  • Michael J. Rebello

Abstract

We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsider-controlled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by European Finance Association in its journal Review of Finance.

Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 93-140

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Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:12:y:2008:i:1:p:93-140

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Cited by:
  1. Ginglinger, Edith & Megginson, William & Waxin, Timothée, 2011. "Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 868-887, September.
  2. Ginglinger, Edith & Waxin, Timothée & Megginson, William, 2009. "Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/3864, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Bermig, Andreas & Dilger, Alexander & Geyer, Hannah, 2011. "Corporate governance and employee power in the boardroom: An applied game theoretical analysis," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 9/2011, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
  4. Wagner, Alexander F., 2011. "Board independence and competence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 71-93, January.
  5. Audretsch, David B. & Hülsbeck, Marcel & Lehmann, Erik E., 2013. "Families as active monitors of firm performance," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 118-130.
  6. Berger, Allen N. & Kick, Thomas & Schaeck, Klaus, 2012. "Executive board composition and bank risk taking," Discussion Papers 03/2012, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  7. Gillet, Joris & Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 2011. "Cartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 126-133, January.

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