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Policy Inertia, Election Uncertainty, and Incumbency Disadvantage of Political Parties

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  • Satyajit Chatterjee
  • Burcu Eyigungor

Abstract

We document that postwar U.S. elections show a strong pattern of “incumbency disadvantage”: if a party has held the presidency of the country or the governorship of a state for some time, that party tends to lose popularity in the subsequent election. We show that this fact can be explained by a combination of policy inertia and unpredictability in election outcomes. A quantitative analysis shows that the observed magnitude of incumbency disadvantage can arise in several different models of policy inertia. Normative and positive implications of policy inertia leading to incumbency disadvantage are explored.

Suggested Citation

  • Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2020. "Policy Inertia, Election Uncertainty, and Incumbency Disadvantage of Political Parties," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(6), pages 2600-2638.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:87:y:2020:i:6:p:2600-2638.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdaa010
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    Cited by:

    1. Marina Azzimonti & Laura Karpuska & Gabriel Mihalache, 2023. "Bargaining Over Taxes And Entitlements In The Era Of Unequal Growth," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(3), pages 893-941, August.
    2. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2023. "The Changing Polarization of Party Ideologies: The Role of Sorting," Working Papers 23-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    3. Marina Azzimonti & Gabriel P. Mihalache & Laura Karpuska, 2020. "Bargaining over Taxes and Entitlements," NBER Working Papers 27595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Dodlova, Marina & Zudenkova, Galina, 2021. "Incumbents’ performance and political extremism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    5. Marina Azzimonti & Laura Karpuska & Gabriel Mihalache, 2020. "Bargaining over Mandatory Spending and Entitlements," Department of Economics Working Papers 20-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rational partisan model; Policy inertia; Incumbency disadvantage; Election uncertainty; Policy extremism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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