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Government Debt Management: The Long and the Short of It

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Listed:
  • Elisa Faraglia
  • Albert Marcet
  • Rigas Oikonomou
  • Andrew Scott

Abstract

Standard optimal Debt Management (DM) models prescribe a dominant role for long bonds and advocate against issuing short bonds. They require very large positions in order to complete markets and assume each period that governments repurchase all outstanding bonds and reissue (r/r) new ones. These features of DM are inconsistent with U.S. data. We introduce incomplete markets via small transaction costs which serves to make optimal DM more closely resemble the data : r/r are negligible, short bond issuance substantial and persistent and short and long bonds positively co-vary. Intuitively, long bonds help smooth taxes over states and short bonds over time. Solving incomplete market models with multiple assets is challenging so a further contribution of this article is introducing a novel computational method to find global solutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Elisa Faraglia & Albert Marcet & Rigas Oikonomou & Andrew Scott, 2019. "Government Debt Management: The Long and the Short of It," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(6), pages 2554-2604.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:86:y:2019:i:6:p:2554-2604.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdy061
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    Cited by:

    1. Jochen Mankart & Rigas Oikonomou, 2017. "Household Search and the Aggregate Labour Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1735-1788.
    2. François Le Grand & Xavier Ragot, 2022. "Managing Inequality Over Business Cycles: Optimal Policies With Heterogeneous Agents And Aggregate Shocks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(1), pages 511-540, February.
    3. Boris Chafwehé & Rigas Oikonomou & Romanos Priftis & Lukas Vogel, 2021. "(Optimal) Monetary Policy with and without Debt," Staff Working Papers 21-5, Bank of Canada.
    4. Dmitry Matveev, 2021. "Time‐Consistent Management of a Liquidity Trap with Government Debt," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(8), pages 2129-2165, December.
    5. Faraglia, E. & Marcet, A. & Oikonomou, R. & Scott, A., 2019. "A Short Note on Optimal Debt Management under Asymmetric Information," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1761, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes & Pierre Yared, 2021. "Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment: Revisiting Lucas-Stokey," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(5), pages 1640-1665.
    7. Equiza-Goñi, Juan & Faraglia, Elisa & Oikonomou, Rigas, 2023. "Union debt management," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    8. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/4lhe3u3c38ojohjlcbfaupcjr is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Boris Chafwehe Author-Email: boris.chafwehe@uclouvain.be & Rigas Oikonomou & Romanos Priftis & Lukas Vogel, 2018. "Endogenous forward guidance," Working Paper Research 354, National Bank of Belgium.
    10. Saki Bigio & Galo Nuño & Juan Passadore, 2019. "A framework for debt-maturity management," Working Papers 1919, Banco de España.
    11. Alex Clymo & Andrea Lanteri, 2020. "Fiscal Policy with Limited-Time Commitment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(627), pages 623-652.
    12. Max Ole Liemen & Olaf Posch, 2022. "FTPL and the Maturity Structure of Government Debt in the New Keynesian Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 9840, CESifo.
    13. Alex Clymo & Andrea Lanteri & Alessandro Villa, 2023. "Capital and Labor Taxes with Costly State Contingency," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 51, pages 943-964, December.
    14. Rigas Oikonomou & Albert Marcet & Elisa Faraglia, 2016. "Long term Government Bonds," 2016 Meeting Papers 565, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Bouakez, Hafedh & Oikonomou, Rigas & Priftis, Romanos, 2018. "Optimal debt management in a liquidity trap," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 5-21.
    16. Nada Azmy Elberry & Frank Naert & Stijn Goeminne, 2023. "Optimal public debt composition during debt crises: A review of theoretical literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 351-376, April.
    17. Saki Bigio & Galo Nuño & Juan Passadore, 2023. "Debt-Maturity Management with Liquidity Costs," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 119-190.
    18. Alex Clymo & Andrea Lanteri & Alessandro Villa, 2023. "Capital and Labor Taxes with Costly State Contingency," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 51, pages 943-964, December.
    19. George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, 2015. "A History of U.S. Debt Limits," NBER Working Papers 21799, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4lhe3u3c38ojohjlcbfaupcjr is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Anmol Bhandari & David Evans & Mikhail Golosov & Thomas Sargent, 2019. "The Optimal Maturity of Government Debt," 2019 Meeting Papers 1011, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    22. George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, 2020. "Debt and Taxes in Eight U.S. Wars and Two Insurrections," NBER Working Papers 27115, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bond repurchases; Computational methods; Debt management; Fiscal policy; Incomplete markets; Maturity structure; Tax smoothing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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