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Negotiating with Labor under Financial Distress

Author

Listed:
  • Efraim Benmelech
  • Nittai K. Bergman
  • Ricardo J. Enriquez

Abstract

We analyze how firms renegotiate labor contracts to extract concessions from labor. While anecdotal evidence suggests that firms tend to renegotiate wages downward in times of financial distress, there is no empirical evidence that documents such renegotiation, its determinants, and its magnitude. This article attempts to fill this gap. Using a unique data set of airlines, which includes detailed information on wages and pension plans, we document an empirical link between airline financial distress, pension underfunding, and wage concessions.

Suggested Citation

  • Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman & Ricardo J. Enriquez, 2012. "Negotiating with Labor under Financial Distress," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 28-67.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rcorpf:v:1:y:2012:i:1:p:28-67.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation

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