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Incentives, Choice, and Accountability in the Provision of Public Services

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  • Timothy Besley
  • Maitreesh Ghatak

Abstract

This paper discusses a theoretical framework to study the issues of competition and incentives without relying on the standard profit-oriented 'market' model in the context of the debates about public-service reform in the UK. It uses the idea that the production of public services coheres around a mission, and discusses how decentralized service provision can raise productivity by matching motivated workers to their preferred missions. Our focus on competition and incentives cuts across traditional debates about public versus private ownership and allows for the possibility of involving private non-profit organizations. We also address concerns about the consequences of allowing more flexibility in mission design and competition on inequality. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2003. "Incentives, Choice, and Accountability in the Provision of Public Services," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 19(2), pages 235-249, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:235-249
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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