Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game
AbstractCommon knowledge plays an important role in coordination problems and coordination problems are central to many areas of economic policy. In this paper, I review some common-knowledge puzzles culminating in the electronic-mail game. These puzzles may seem distant from practical concerns. However, I then argue why insights derived from this literature are useful in interpreting empirical evidence of how people coordinate under uncertainty and in understanding the role of communication in coordinating behaviour. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 18 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm340, Yale School of Management.
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006.
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- Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2013. "Finite-order type spaces and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 689-719.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Xiong, Siyang, 2013. "The e-mail game phenomenon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 147-156.
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