British Utility Regulation: Theory, Practice, and Reform
AbstractThe paper considers the design and performance of the new regulatory regime for U.K. utilities. It describes the RPI-X price caps and considers the scope for regulatory discretion and capture. Particular attention is paid to the informational requirements for the determination of prices, the scope for intervention between periods, the independence of regulators, and the promotion of competition. Five arguments for regulatory reform are identified: regulatory arbitrage; capture; administrative costs; investment, sunk costs, and regulatory hold-up; and political instability. A number of reforms are then proposed. These include: merging regulatory bodies; a common set of financial rules; a common basis for efficiency comparisons; and reforming the MMC and judicial review. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 10 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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