Preferences over social risk
AbstractWe elicit individual preferences over social risk. We identify the extent to which these preferences are correlated with preferences over individual risk and the well-being of others. We examine these preferences in the context of laboratory experiments over small, anonymous groups, although the methodological issues extend to larger groups that form endogenously (e.g., families, committees, communities). Preferences over social risk can be closely approximated by individual risk attitudes when subjects have no information about the risk preferences of other group members. We find no evidence that subjects systematically reveal different risk attitudes in a social setting with no prior knowledge about the risk preferences of others compared to when they solely bear the consequences of the decision. However, we also find that subjects are significantly more risk averse when they know the risk preferences of other group members. Copyright 2013 Oxford University Press 2012 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 65 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Alexia Gaudeul, 2013. "Social preferences under uncertainty," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-024, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
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