Time-consistent linear taxation and redistribution in an overlapping-generations framework
AbstractWe study time-consistent labour and capital income linear taxation using an infinite-horizon overlapping-generations model of a small open economy. Individuals have different productivities and the government intervenes for purely redistributive purposes. The study of time-consistent taxation requires the introduction of borrowing restrictions in the economy. We characterize the time-consistent solution and consider alternative solutions based on a simple tax rule. We demonstrate the existence and the uniqueness of the time-consistent solution using a log-linear utility function. We provide numerical comparisons between time-consistent and time-inconsistent linear taxation: the importance of being able to make commitment decreases when the differences between individuals increase. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 54 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
Other versions of this item:
- Michel, P. & Paul, T., 1998. "Time-Consistent Linear Taxation and Redistribution in an Overlapping-Generations Framework," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III 98a17, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.