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The Arms Trade Game: From Laissez-Faire to a Common Defence Policy

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  • Levine, Paul
  • Smith, Ron

Abstract

Multinational arms export control has been the subject of discussion in a variety of fora, from the United Nations through to the Wassenaar group of arms producers. It is widely recognised that free trade in arms can have negative externalities on national security and there are benefits from the international coordination of controls. However, there has been relatively little economic analysis of these issues, partly because the market for arms is somewhat unusual. This paper develops a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market and compares a variety of possible regimes from laissez-faire at one extreme, to a common defence policy at the other. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Levine, Paul & Smith, Ron, 2000. "The Arms Trade Game: From Laissez-Faire to a Common Defence Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 357-380, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:52:y:2000:i:2:p:357-80
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    Cited by:

    1. García-Alonso, María D.C. & Levine, Paul, 2008. "Strategic procurement, openness and market structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1180-1190, September.
    2. María Del Carmen García‐Alonso & Paul Levine, 2005. "Arms Export Controls, Subsidies And The Wto Exemption," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 52(2), pages 305-322, May.
    3. Margherita Comola, 2009. "Democracies, politics and arms supply: A bilateral trade equation," PSE Working Papers halshs-00585982, HAL.
    4. Gangopadhyay Partha, 2014. "A Formal Model of Arms Market with Cash-for-Favours," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(3), pages 1-18, August.
    5. Paul Dunne & Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine & Ron Smith, 2005. "Military Procurement, Industry Structure and Regional Conflict," Studies in Economics 0502, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    6. Vincenzo Bove & Claudio Deiana & Roberto Nistic�, 2018. "Global Arms Trade and Oil Dependence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(2), pages 272-299.
    7. Paul Levine & Fotis Mouzakis & Ron Smith, 2000. "Arms export controls and emerging domestic producers," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 505-531.
    8. Paul Dunne & Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine & Ron Smith, 2007. "Determining The Defence Industrial Base," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(3), pages 199-221.

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