In this paper, a social-welfare maximizing public-pension policy is modeled within the framework of the well-known two-overlapping-generations, general-equilibrium model with rational expectations. The model is used to analyze the effects of aging on the evolution of public-pension schemes. Analytical results are derived for the long run as well as for the short run by the method of comparative statics and comparative dynamics respectively. This shows that the short-run consequences of aging depend crucially on the existing size of the pay-as-you-go-scheme. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 49 (1997) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 29-42 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
plain text,
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:49:y:1997:i:1:p:29-42
Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK Fax: 01865 267 985 Email: Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)