Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy
AbstractAn infinitely repeated monetary policy game a la R. Barro and D. Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 48 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Other versions of this item:
- Christian Schultz, 1996. "Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy," EPRU Working Paper Series, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 96-06, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Christian Schultz, 1996. "Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 96-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2003. "On the Dynamic Consistency of Optimal Monetary Policy," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna 463, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Cem Mehmet Baydur & Bora Suslu & Selahattin Bekmez, 2004. "The independence of central bank in view of Rogoff: The Turkish experience," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(1-2), pages 143-.
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