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Contractual Arrangements as Signaling Devices: Evidence from Franchising

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Author Info
Lafontaine, Francine

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 9 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 256-89
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:256-89

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  1. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1996. "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data," NBER Working Papers 5585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Benito Arruñada & Luis Garicano & Luis Vázquez, 1998. "Completing Contracts Ex Post: How Car Manufacturers Manage Car Dealers," Economics Working Papers 267, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2004. [Downloadable!]
  3. Benito Arruñada & Luis Vázquez & Giorgio Zanarone, 2009. "Institutional constraints on organizations: the case of Spanish car dealerships," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 15-26. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Hendrikse, G.W.J. & Jiang, T., 2005. "Plural Form in Franchising: An Incomplete Contracting Approach," Research Paper ERS-2005-090-ORG Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sudhindra Seshadri, 2002. "Outlet ownership in franchising systems: an agency based approach," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(6), pages 355-369. [Downloadable!]
  6. Eugene Canjels & Ute Volz, 2001. "Share Contracts and Unobserved Ability," SCEPA Working Papers 2001-03, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School. [Downloadable!]
  7. Etienne Pfister & Bruno Deffains & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Stéphane Saussier, 2006. "Institutions and contracts: Franchising," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 53-78, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Benito Arruñada & Luis Garicano & Luis Vázquez, 1999. "Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution," Economics Working Papers 424, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Magali Chaudey & Muriel Fadairo, 2009. "Double-Sided Externalities and Vertical Contracting : Evidence from European Franchising Data," Working Papers hal-00376243_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  10. Manuel González & Benito Arruñada & Alberto Fernández, 1999. "Causes of Subcontracting: Evidence from Panel Data on Construction Firms," Economics Working Papers 428, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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