The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Regulation and Privatization
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
Volume (Year): 9 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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- David Martimort & Salvatore Piccolo, 2010. "The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 204-29, February.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 2001. "Separation of powers and development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 129-145, February.
- Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
- Allen, Douglas W. & Lueck, Dean, 1999. "Searching For Ratchet Effects In Agricultural Contracts," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 24(02), December.
- Giulio Federico, 2004. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Development and Comp Systems 0409004, EconWPA.
- Giulio Federico, 2001. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2001-16, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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