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• Esther Gal-Or

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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 8 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 377-93
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:2:p:377-93

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1. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-1.