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Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation

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Author Info
Cramton, Peter
Schwartz, Alan

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 7 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 27-53
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:27-53

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Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. French, Kenneth R & McCormick, Robert E, 1984. "Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 417-41, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Michael C. Jensen, 1987. "The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 102-148. [Downloadable!]
  5. Vincent, Daniel R, 1990. "Dynamic Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(1), pages 49-61, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Samuelson, William F., 1985. "Competitive bidding with entry costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 53-57. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kaplan, Steven, 1989. " Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 611-32, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Harstad, Ronald M, 1990. "Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 421-29, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Alan J. Auerbach, 1988. "Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number auer88-1.
  12. David Hirshleifer, 1989. "Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1193, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lloyd, William P. & Modani, Naval K. & Hand, John H., 1987. "The effect of the degree of ownership control on firm diversification, market value, and merger activity," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 303-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Nathan, Kevin S. & O'Keefe, Terrence B., 1989. "The rise in takeover premiums : An exploratory study," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 101-119, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long, 1984. "Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 54-68, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1988. "Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 101-136 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  18. Schwartz, Alan, 1986. "Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 229-53, Fall.
  19. Bhattacharyya, S., 1990. "The Analytics Of Takeover Bidding: Initial Bids And Their Premia," GSIA Working Papers 89-90-03, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  20. Michael J. Fishman, 1988. "A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 88-101, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Spulber, Daniel F, 1990. "Auctions and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 325-44, Fall.
  22. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul D., 2007. "When Are Auctions Best?," Research Papers 1973, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Flavio Toxvaerd, 2004. "Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical Chairs," Discussion Paper Series dp359, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Ivaldi, Marc & Motis, Jrissy, 2007. "Mergers as Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6434, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Utz Weitzel, 2005. "Bargaining in Mergers: The Role of Outside Options and Termination Provisions," Working Papers 05-32, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Utz Weitzel & Stephanie Rosenkranz, 2007. "Bargaining in Mergers and Termination Fees," Working Papers 07-06, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Rosato, Antonio, 2008. "“Matching Auctions” for Hostile Takeovers: A Model with Endogenous Target," MPRA Paper 15083, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
  7. Yeon-Koo Che & Tracy R. Lewis, 2006. "The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests," Discussion Papers 0607-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Gino Loyola, 2008. "Optimal takeover contests with toeholds," Economics Working Papers we083217, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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