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Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation

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  • John M. de Figueiredo

Abstract

This article examines the effect of judicial ideology on the selection and outcome of telecommunications regulatory cases. Using a dataset of Federal Communications Commission orders and trials from 1990 to 1995, this article shows that changes in the makeup of the bench of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affects not only who wins cases, but also the cases selected for litigation. Firms are more likely to bring cases when the agency decisions are ideologically distant from the bench than when the two actors are ideologically close. Randomly selected judges vote ideologically as the firms' actions predict they will, with Republican judges overturning Democratic agency decisions, and vice versa. Finally, the article provides initial evidence that regulatory uncertainty may lead to more litigation. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • John M. de Figueiredo, 2005. "Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 501-523, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:21:y:2005:i:2:p:501-523
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewi013
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Santolino & Magnus Söderberg, 2014. "Modelling appellate courts’ responses in motor injury disputes," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 393-407, December.
    2. Joanna M. Shepherd, 2009. "The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' Voting," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 169-206, January.
    3. Jeff Yates & Damon M. Cann & Brent D. Boyea, 2013. "Judicial Ideology and the Selection of Disputes for U.S. Supreme Court Adjudication," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(4), pages 847-865, December.
    4. Allen H. Huang & Jianghua Shen & Amy Y. Zang, 2022. "The unintended benefit of the risk factor mandate of 2005," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 1319-1355, December.
    5. Erin B. Kaheny & Susan Brodie Haire & Sara C. Benesh, 2008. "Change over Tenure: Voting, Variance, and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 490-503, July.
    6. Ganglmair, Bernhard & Helmers, Christian & Love, Brian J., 2024. "Do judicial assignments matter? Evidence from random case allocation," ZEW Discussion Papers 24-003, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. John M. de Figueiredo, 2009. "Integrated Political Strategy," NBER Working Papers 15053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Miguel Santolino & Magnus Söderberg, 2011. "The influence of decision-maker effort and case complexity on appealed rulings subject to multi-categorical selection," IREA Working Papers 201115, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Sep 2011.
    9. Joshua B. Fischman, 2011. "Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of Consensus Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 781-809.
    10. David Gliksberg, 2014. "Does the Law Matter? Win Rates and Law Reforms," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(2), pages 378-407, June.
    11. Allen Huang & Kai Wai Hui & Reeyarn Zhiyang Li, 2019. "Federal Judge Ideology: A New Measure of Ex Ante Litigation Risk," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 431-489, May.

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