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Policing Team Production through Job Design

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  • Valsecchi, Irene

Abstract

This article is concerned with job design, that is, the grouping of tasks into jobs, in teams of risk-neutral homogeneous agents. It shows that when only some tasks are observable by the agents or monitorable by the principal, job design can restrict the set of sequential equilibria to the Pareto optimal one, by making incomplete information from the agents or the principal effective in overcoming coordination failures and conflict among coworkers. Job design is shown to be a constituent part of the overall incentive system, just as efficient compensation rules are. Some criteria for optimal task assignment are derived. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 12 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 361-75

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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:2:p:361-75

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Cited by:
  1. Harvey James & Derek Johnson, 2002. "Why Are There Explicit Contracts of Employment?," Law and Economics 0202001, EconWPA.
  2. Harvey S. James Jr., 1997. "A Tale of Two Wages: Separating Contract from Governance," Microeconomics 9705001, EconWPA.
  3. Anja Schöttner, 2005. "Relational Contracts and Job Design," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-052, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  4. Harvey S. James Jr., 1997. "A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents: Employment Contracts, Common Law, and the Theory of the Firm," Law and Economics 9705001, EconWPA, revised 04 Feb 2002.

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