Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation
AbstractCapital requirements are a key element in containing systemic risk. This article argues that the market needs to play a more significant role in determining these requirements. The Basel process has a bad track record and there are inherent methodological and political difficulties in a group of regulators, particularly an international one, determining the appropriate amount of capital for a given risk. An added role for the market depends, however, on fuller disclosure by banks of their risks and minimization of the moral hazard created by bailouts, so creditors and counterparties bear a fuller measure of the risk. Oxford University Press 2010, all rights reserved, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of International Economic Law.
Volume (Year): 13 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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