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Asymmetric Price Increase In Critical Loss Analysis: A Reply To Langenfeld And Li

Author

Listed:
  • Øystein Daljord
  • Lars Sørgard
  • Øyvind Thomassen

Abstract

James Langenfeld and Wenqing Li claim that the market delineating criterion of Øystein Daljord, Lars Sørgard, and Øyvind Thomassen for an asymmetric small, but significant and nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP) is logically inconsistent and tends to define too broad antitrust markets. We show that these claims are false.

Suggested Citation

  • Øystein Daljord & Lars Sørgard & Øyvind Thomassen, 2014. "Asymmetric Price Increase In Critical Loss Analysis: A Reply To Langenfeld And Li," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 765-768.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:10:y:2014:i:3:p:765-768.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhu015
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Baltzopoulos, Apostolos & Kim, Jaewon & Mandorff, Martin, 2015. "UPP Analysis in Five Recent Merger Cases," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2015:3, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
    2. Yannis Katsoulacos & Natalia S. Pavlova & Andrey E. Shastitko, 2020. "Delineating market boundaries in the Russian mass notification market: An application of critical loss analysis," Russian Journal of Economics, ARPHA Platform, vol. 6(2), pages 177-195, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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