The informal recruitment channel and the quality of job-worker matches: an analysis on Italian survey data
AbstractThis article analyzes the consequences of being recruited through the informal channel in the Italian labor market using data collected through a new survey implemented by Institute for the Development of the Vocational Training of Workers--ISFOL. We find that, while workers entering the labor market via "professional ties" enjoy a wage bonus and a reduction in entry times, those recruited via "family and friends" referrals save on entry times but receive on average lower wages. Moreover, the use of the family channel reduces the returns to education and is associated with the phenomenon of "over-education," suggesting the existence of some mismatches between workers' and jobs' characteristics. Copyright 2011 The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Associazione ICC. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Industrial and Corporate Change.
Volume (Year): 20 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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- Zaharieva, Anna, 2013.
"Social welfare and wage inequality in search equilibrium with personal contacts,"
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- Anna Zaharieva, 2011. "Social Welfare and Wage Inequality in Search Equilibrium with Personal Contacts," Working Papers 459, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Yuliia Stupnytska, 2014. "Explaining the U-Shape of the Referral Hiring Pattern in a Search Model with Heterogeneous Workers," Working Papers 511, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
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