Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay
AbstractPrior work on long-term contracts and the incentive to shirk has focused almost exclusively on Major League Baseball. The current inquiry is the first to examine shirking in the National Basketball Association. We employed two different measures of player productivity. When the NBA's measure is used, we find evidence consistent with allegations of shirking behavior. But when productivity is measured in a fashion more consistent with economists' definition of marginal product, the evidence of shirking evaporates. (JEL J41, J44, L83) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 44 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
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