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Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay

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  • David J. Berri
  • Anthony C. Krautmann

Abstract

Prior work on long-term contracts and the incentive to shirk has focused almost exclusively on Major League Baseball. The current inquiry is the first to examine shirking in the National Basketball Association. We employed two different measures of player productivity. When the NBA's measure is used, we find evidence consistent with allegations of shirking behavior. But when productivity is measured in a fashion more consistent with economists' definition of marginal product, the evidence of shirking evaporates. (JEL J41, J44, L83) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbj033
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 44 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 536-546

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:44:y:2006:i:3:p:536-546

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Cited by:
  1. Stephen Shmanske, 2010. "Dynamic Effort, Sustainability, Myopia, and 110% Effort," Working Papers 1005, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists.
  2. Dr Alex Bryson, 2012. "Why Are Migrants Paid More?," NIESR Discussion Papers 3209, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  3. Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Jonathan A. Lanning, 2013. "Workers' Responses to Incentives: The Case of Pending MLB Free Agents," Working Papers 1304, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  4. Feddersen, Arne & Humphreys, Brad & Soebbing, Brian, 2012. "Cost Incentives in European Football," Working Papers 2012-13, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.

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