Some Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Antimerger Relief in the United States
AbstractThe extent of structural relief obtained by the government in a Section 7 settlement is modeled as an outcome of a bargaining game between the antitrust agency and parties to the merger. This framework is applied to data from 73 Section 7 cases settled during 1990--2000. The fraction of competitive overlap subject to divestiture is shown to depend on the extent of merger-specific efficiencies, the anticompetitive potential of the merger, and the hostage effect facing the merging firms, as well as the degree of media coverage of the case, the workload of the agency, and the partisan composition of Congress.(JEL L44, C24) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Other versions of this item:
- Mikhail Kouliavtsev, 2004. "Some Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Antimerger Relief in the United States," Industrial Organization 0404001, EconWPA.
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
- C24 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models
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- Marcos Avalos & Rafael E. De Hoyos, 2008.
"An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy,"
Review of Industrial Organization,
Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 113-130, March.
- Mikhail Kouliavtsev, 2007. "Measuring the Extent of Structural Remedy in Section 7 Settlements: Was the US DOJ Successful in the 1990s?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 1-27, February.
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