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Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation

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  • Dakshina G. De Silva

Abstract

This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained. (JEL D44) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 43 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 55-66

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:1:p:55-66

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Cited by:
  1. Dakshina G. De Silva & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005. "The Impact Of Change In Auction Format On Bidding Behavior," Microeconomics 0512009, EconWPA.
  2. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald & Vermeulen, Dries, 2006. "Sequential Auctions with Synergies: The Paradox of Positive Synergies," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2007. "A change in the timing of auctions with synergies and its impact on bidding behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 60-65, April.
  4. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "An experimental comparison of sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies," Research Memorandum 055, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Klenio Barbosa & Pierre C. Boyer, 2012. "Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing," CESifo Working Paper Series 3947, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2005. "Stochastic synergies in sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 183-201, April.
  7. Dakshina De Silva & Thomas Jeitschko & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2009. "Entry and Bidding in Common and Private Value Auctions with an Unknown Number of Rivals," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 73-93, September.

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