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Arbitrator Compromise in Final Offer Arbitration: Evidence from Major League Baseball

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Author Info
Daniel R. Marburger
Abstract

This article presents evidence that the preferred awards of arbitrators in final-offer arbitration (FOA) compromise between the perspectives of the bargainers. Using Major League Baseball FOA offers between 1986--2002, this study finds strong evidence that final offers (which are strategically formulated around the preferred award) are a weighted average of the player's salary in the previous season and the average free agent salary. The findings are particularly interesting because FOA was created to eliminate arbitrator compromise. (JEL J520, L830) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbh044
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 42 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 60-68
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:42:y:2004:i:1:p:60-68

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Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism

Cited by:
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  1. John D. Burger & Richard D. Grayson & Stephen J.K. Walters, 2006. "Initial Public Offerings of Ballplayers," Working Papers 0624, International Association of Sports Economists. [Downloadable!]
  2. Turner, Chad & Hakes, Jahn Karl, 2007. "The Collective Bargaining Effects of NBA Player Productivity Dynamics," MPRA Paper 5058, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Turner, Chad & Hakes, Jahn, 2007. "Pay, productivity and aging in Major League Baseball," MPRA Paper 4326, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-15.


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