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Reputation in Bargaining: National Football League Contract Negotiations

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Author Info

  • Michael Conlin

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Syracuse University, 110E Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244.)

Abstract

This article examines a sequence of two bargaining games where a single buyer participates in both. The bargaining games are modeled with two-sided private information and are "linked" through the buyer's valuation, which is positively correlated across bargaining games. I empirically test the comparative static results obtained from the model's unique equilibrium outcome using National Football League (NFL) contract data. The empirical results suggest that an NFL team's contract negotiations are affected by not only the terms agreed to in the team's prior contract negotiations but also the length of time required to negotiate these prior contracts. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 40 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 241-259

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:241-259

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Cited by:
  1. Boulier, Bryan L. & Stekler, H.O. & Coburn, Jason & Rankins, Timothy, 2010. "Evaluating National Football League draft choices: The passing game," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 589-605, July.
  2. Hodge, Frank & Hopkins, Patrick E. & Pratt, Jamie, 2006. "Management reporting incentives and classification credibility: The effects of reporting discretion and reputation," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 623-634, October.

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