Reputation in Bargaining: National Football League Contract Negotiations
AbstractThis article examines a sequence of two bargaining games where a single buyer participates in both. The bargaining games are modeled with two-sided private information and are "linked" through the buyer's valuation, which is positively correlated across bargaining games. I empirically test the comparative static results obtained from the model's unique equilibrium outcome using National Football League (NFL) contract data. The empirical results suggest that an NFL team's contract negotiations are affected by not only the terms agreed to in the team's prior contract negotiations but also the length of time required to negotiate these prior contracts. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 40 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
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- Boulier, Bryan L. & Stekler, H.O. & Coburn, Jason & Rankins, Timothy, 2010.
"Evaluating National Football League draft choices: The passing game,"
International Journal of Forecasting,
Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 589-605, July.
- Bryan L. Boulier & Herman O. Stekler & Jason Coburn & Timothy Rankins, 2009. "Evaluating National Football League Draft Choices: The Passing Game," Working Papers 2009-003, The George Washington University, Department of Economics, Research Program on Forecasting.
- Hodge, Frank & Hopkins, Patrick E. & Pratt, Jamie, 2006. "Management reporting incentives and classification credibility: The effects of reporting discretion and reputation," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 623-634, October.
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