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Bargaining Experiments with Deadlines and Random Delays

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  • Sterbenz, Frederic P
  • Phillips, Owen R

Abstract

In many bargaining environments there are random delays in the transmission of proposals. Two computerized bargaining experiments are designed to study behavior with this condition. A clock starts counting down from three minutes when the first offer is sent. In one experiment the clock is not stopped once the bargaining begins; in the other it is paused during the time an agent thinks about a counteroffer. All proposals are randomly delayed. Results are compared to a control design with no such delays. Delays create a first mover advantage, and agreements are more uniformly spread across a bargaining period. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Sterbenz, Frederic P & Phillips, Owen R, 2001. "Bargaining Experiments with Deadlines and Random Delays," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(4), pages 616-626, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:39:y:2001:i:4:p:616-26
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    Cited by:

    1. Iriberri, Nagore & Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo, 2022. "Gender Differences in Alternating-Offer Bargaining: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 12561, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    3. Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz & Nagore Iriberri, 2023. "Gender differences in alternating-offer bargaining: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(4), pages 879-914, September.

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