The Effect of Recommended Contributions in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
AbstractRecommended contributions are often observed in fundraising campaigns for charitable and other public goods. We present an experiment investigating the impact of recommended contributions in a voluntary threshold public goods process. We find that when valuations for the public good are heterogeneous, recommended contributions significantly increase the likelihood of efficient provision, although when valuations are homogeneous, the effect of recommendations is less compelling. This article represents a fast step in understanding recommended contributions and other nonbinding, cheap-talk announcements in public goods provision and charitable contributions. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 39 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe & William D. Schulze & Kathleen Segerson, 2006. "Communication and Incentive Mechanisms Based on Group Performance: An Experimental Study of Nonpoint Pollution Control," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(4), pages 599-613, October.
- Elena Cettolin & Arno Riedl, 2011.
"Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3556, CESifo Group Munich.
- Cettolin Elena & Riedl Arno, 2011. "Partial coercion, conditional cooperation, and self-commitment in voluntary contributions to public goods," Research Memorandum 041, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Charles Cadsby & Rachel Croson & Melanie Marks & Elizabeth Maynes, 2008. "Step return versus net reward in the voluntary provision of a threshold public good: An adversarial collaboration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 277-289, June.
- Richard McAdams & Janice Nadler, . "A Third Model of Legal Compliance: Testing for Expressive Effects in a Hawk/Dove Game," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1029, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
- Federica Alberti & Edward J. Cartwright, 2011. "Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-063, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004.
"When in Rome: conformity and the provision of public goods,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics),
Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 395-408, September.
- Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "When In Rome: Conformity and the Provision of Public Goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0217, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- Christoph Engel & Lilia Zhurakhovska, 2013. "Words Substitute Fists – Justifying Punishment in a Public Good Experiment," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_16, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Jan 2014.
- Alexis Belianin & Marco Novarese, 2005. "Trust, communication and equlibrium behaviour in public goods," Experimental 0506001, EconWPA.
- Guillén, Pablo & Hing, Alexander, 2013. "Lying through Their Teeth: Third Party Advice and Truth Telling in a Strategy Proof Mechanism," Working Papers 2013-11, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Rachel Croson & Melanie Marks, 2000. "Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 239-259, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.