Teaching Tools: A Pollution Rights Trading Game
AbstractThis article describes a classroom game in which students simulate the U.S. EPA's market for emission allowances to understand the efficiency benefits of market-based incentives for pollution control. It can be used in either a principles or environmental economics course. Acting as managers of coal-fired power plants facing different clean-up costs, students compare the cost of pollution reduction to the cost of acquiring permits to emit pollution. The game can be conducted in one fifty-minute class period with discussion of the results carried over to the next class. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 35 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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- Lisa R. Anderson & Sarah L. Stafford, 2000. "Choosing Winners and Losers in a Classroom Permit Trading Game," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(1), pages 212-219, July.
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