Governing a Groundwater Commons: A Strategic and Laboratory Analysis of Western Water Law
AbstractThe authors examine strategic behavior in groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources in the American West. Solving a dynamic common-pool resource model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments. Three forms of legal rules--common-pool depletion with a 'rule-of-capture' to establish ownership (absolute ownership doctrine), entry restrictions (prior appropriation doctrine), and stock quotas (correlative rights doctrine)--are examined in terms of their impact on individual strategic behavior in laboratory experiments. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 35 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bodo Sturm & Joachim Weimann, 2006. "Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 419-457, 07.
- Apesteguia, Jose, 2006. "Does information matter in the commons?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-69, May.
- Msangi, Siwa, 2005. "Measuring the Gains to Groundwater Management with Recursive Utility," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19212, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Fischer, Maria-Elisabeth & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2004.
"An intergenerational common pool resource experiment,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 811-836, September.
- Fischer, M.E. & Irlenbusch, B. & Sadrieh, A., 2003. "An Intergenerational Common Pool Resource Experiment," Discussion Paper 2003-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Chermak, Janie M. & Krause, Kate, 2002. "Individual Response, Information, and Intergenerational Common Pool Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 47-70, January.
- García-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Hernán, Roberto & Kujal, Praveen, 2012. "Managing a duopolistic water market with confirmed proposals : an experiment. Gestión de un duopolio acuífero con propuestas confirmadas : un experimento," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/14981, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Gardner, Roy & Herr, Andrew & Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James A., 2000. "The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 515-533, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.