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Governing a Groundwater Commons: A Strategic and Laboratory Analysis of Western Water Law

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  • Gardner, Roy
  • Moore, Michael R
  • Walker, James M

Abstract

The authors examine strategic behavior in groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources in the American West. Solving a dynamic common-pool resource model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments. Three forms of legal rules--common-pool depletion with a 'rule-of-capture' to establish ownership (absolute ownership doctrine), entry restrictions (prior appropriation doctrine), and stock quotas (correlative rights doctrine)--are examined in terms of their impact on individual strategic behavior in laboratory experiments. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Gardner, Roy & Moore, Michael R & Walker, James M, 1997. "Governing a Groundwater Commons: A Strategic and Laboratory Analysis of Western Water Law," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 218-234, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:35:y:1997:i:2:p:218-34
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fischer, Maria-Elisabeth & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2004. "An intergenerational common pool resource experiment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 811-836, September.
    2. Bodo Sturm & Joachim Weimann, 2006. "Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 419-457, July.
    3. Bouveret, Géraldine & Dumitrescu, Roxana & Tankov, Peter, 2022. "Technological change in water use: A mean-field game approach to optimal investment timing," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 9(C).
    4. Wegmann, Johannes & Mußhoff, Oliver, 2019. "Groundwater management institutions in the face of rapid urbanization – Results of a framed field experiment in Bengaluru, India," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 1-1.
    5. Msangi, Siwa, 2005. "Measuring the Gains to Groundwater Management with Recursive Utility," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19212, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Gardner, Roy & Herr, Andrew & Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James A., 2000. "The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 515-533, August.
    7. Liu, Zhuo & Suter, Jordan F. & Messer, Kent D. & Duke, Joshua M. & Michael, Holly A., 2014. "Strategic entry and externalities in groundwater resources: Evidence from the lab," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 181-197.
    8. Apesteguia, Jose, 2006. "Does information matter in the commons?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-69, May.
    9. Varghese, Shalet Korattukudy & Veettil, Prakashan Chellattan & Speelman, Stijn & Buysse, Jeroen & Van Huylenbroeck, Guido, 2013. "Estimating the causal effect of water scarcity on the groundwater use efficiency of rice farming in South India," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 55-64.
    10. Bischoff, Ivo, 2007. "Institutional choice versus communication in social dilemmas--An experimental approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 20-36, January.
    11. Apesteguia, Jose, 2001. "Does Information Matter? Some Experimental Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Game," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 24/2001, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    12. Wakamatsu, Mihoko & Anderson, Christopher M., 2018. "The Endogenous Evolution of Common Property Management Systems," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 211-217.
    13. Najafi Alamdarlo, Hamed & Pourmozafar, Hosein & Vakilpoor, Mohamad Hasan, 2019. "Improving demand technology and internalizing external effects in groundwater market framework, case study: Qazvin plain in Iran," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 213(C), pages 164-173.
    14. Nicholas Ryan & Anant Sudarshan, 2020. "Rationing the Commons," Working Papers 2020-93, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    15. Taylor, Rebecca & Zilberman, David, 2015. "The Diffusion of Process Innovation: The Case of Drip Irrigation in California," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205320, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    16. Chermak, Janie M. & Krause, Kate, 2002. "Individual Response, Information, and Intergenerational Common Pool Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 47-70, January.
    17. Madani, Kaveh & Dinar, Ariel, 2012. "Non-cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 34-45.
    18. Nicholas Ryan & Anant Sudarshan, 2020. "Rationing the Commons," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2239, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    19. Nicholas Ryan & Anant Sudarshan, 2020. "Rationing the Commons," NBER Working Papers 27473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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