What Does Reputation Really Assure? The Relationship of Trademarks to Expectations and Legal Remedies
AbstractTheoretical and empirical considerations suggest that trademarks guarantee more than just quality: they assure specific performance, that is, fulfillment of the specific terms of the contract. The specific performance hypothesis implies that a firm's investment in trademark capital varies directly with the damages that its customers expect to bear from a breach and the legal difficulties of obtaining compensation. The hypothesis also helps to explain why competitors of firms whose products are recalled lose wealth, why some damages allowed by law intentionally provide less than full compensation, and why firms who sell only to other firms also invest in trademarks. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 32 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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- Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 2004. "The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law: An Economic Approach," Economics Discussion Papers 581, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
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