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An Analysis of the Impact of Congressional Term Limits

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  • Reed, W Robert
  • Schansberg, D Eric

Abstract

The authors examine the impact of a six-term tenure limit on members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The first part of this study develops a methodological framework for simulating the quantitative impact of term limits. The second part of this study uses this framework to estimate the effects of term limits on (1) the value of holding office, (2) turnover, and (3) the size of the Democratic majority in the House. Both steady-state and transition period effects are explored. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Reed, W Robert & Schansberg, D Eric, 1994. "An Analysis of the Impact of Congressional Term Limits," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(1), pages 79-91, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:32:y:1994:i:1:p:79-91
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    Cited by:

    1. Natalya Brown, 2014. "Candidate Ambition and Advancement under Term Limits," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(1), pages 53-64, March.
    2. John Lott, 2006. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 263-300, December.
    3. W. Reed & D. Schansberg & James Wilbanks & Zhen Zhu, 1998. "The relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 85-104, January.
    4. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.

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