Pot-Bellies, Cattle Breeds and Revealing Signals
AbstractBelieve it or not, there are many interesting economic puzzles at cattle auctions. For example, why does the Holstein breed completely dominate veal sales and why do other breeds get slaughtered in terms of price when they enter the veal ring? The answer lies in the nature of veal production and the characteristics of the auction that provide the potential for opportunistic behavior. The Holstein's unique pot-belly signal provides a cheap solution to the cheating problem and results in the domination of the Holstein breed at the auction. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 31 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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"The Value of Third-Party Certification of Preconditioning Claims at Iowa Feeder Cattle Auctions,"
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Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 39(03), December.
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- Rat-Aspert, Olivier & Weldegebriel, Habtu T. & Stott, Alistair W. & Fourichon, C., 2008. "Managing animal health status information in the cattle market," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44064, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Chymis, Athanasios G. & James, Harvey S., Jr. & Konduru, Srinivasa & Pierce, Vern L., 2004. "Asymmetric Information In Cattle Auctions: The Problem Of Revaccinations," Working Papers 26039, University of Missouri Columbia, Department of Agricultural Economics.
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