This paper determines the optimal level of firm-specific training and the optimal level of layoffs when some workers are unreliable in that they may receive and accept offers from outside the firm; more specifically, the paper determines the evolution of firm-specific training and layoffs as a worker acquires a reputation for reliability with his employer. The paper shows, for example, that layoffs may be higher or lower than the level implied by the condition that a worker's value of leisure equal the value of his contribution to output. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.
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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 29 (1991) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 166-72 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:1:p:166-72
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