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The Political Economy of U.S. Wheat Legislation

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  • Babcock, Bruce A
  • Carter, Colin A
  • Schmitz, Andrew

Abstract

Both taxpayer subsidies to U.S. wheat producers and domestic deadweight losses increased as a result of the U.S. wheat program adopted in 1985. A calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative wheat policies shows that mandatory production controls with no taxpayer expense could have made wheat producers as well off as the adopted policy. Gary Becker's (1983) theory of competition among interest groups and Sam Peltzman's (1976) theory of the equilibrium amount of regulation are shown to be consistent with the observed policy choice if the list of affected interest groups includes agricultural input suppliers and grain marketing firms. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Babcock, Bruce A & Carter, Colin A & Schmitz, Andrew, 1990. "The Political Economy of U.S. Wheat Legislation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(2), pages 335-353, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:28:y:1990:i:2:p:335-53
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    Cited by:

    1. Fertő, Imre, 1998. "Az agrárpolitika politikai gazdaságtana II. Az agrárpolitikák magyarázata [The political economy of agrarian policy. Part II. Explanation of the agrarian policies]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 297-316.
    2. Julian Alston & Colin Carter, 1991. "Causes And Consequences Of Farm Policy," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(1), pages 107-121, January.
    3. D.S. Bullock & K. Salhofer, 1998. "Measuring the social costs of suboptimal combinations of policy instruments: A general framework and an example," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 18(3), pages 249-259, May.
    4. Salhofer, Klaus & Schmid, Erwin, 2004. "Distributive leakages of agricultural support: some empirical evidence," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 51-62, January.
    5. Brooks, Jonathan, 1997. "Congressional Voting On Farm Payment Limitations: Political Pressure Of Ideological Conviction?," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 1-15, December.
    6. McLaren, John, 1998. "Consequences of discretion in the formation of commodities policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 347-370, September.
    7. Jonathan Brooks, 1996. "Agricultural Policies In Oecd Countries: What Can We Learn From Political Economy Models?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1‐4), pages 366-389, January.
    8. Muth, Mary K & Rucker, Randal R & Thurman, Walter N & Chuang, Ching-Ta, 2003. "The Fable of the Bees Revisited: Causes and Consequences of the U.S. Honey Program," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 479-516, October.
    9. David S. Bullock & Klaus Salhofer & Jukka Kola, 1999. "The Normative Analysis of Agricultural Policy: A General Framework and Review," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 512-535, September.

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