Sellers select both price and quality, but buyers have limited information about those choices in the experiments reported here. Market efficiency is high under full information with truthful advertising of prices and qualities, but is much lower with no advertising of price or quality. Efficiency does not improve when sellers were permitted to advertise price, but not quality, and in half of these experiments "lemons" outcomes occur. Although the range of outcomes is great, it cannot be claimed that price advertising improves efficiency when quality is unknown. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 28 (1990) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 39-56 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
plain text,
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:28:y:1990:i:1:p:39-56
Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK Fax: 01865 267 985 Email: Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006.
"Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment,"
Working Papers
0605, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: